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Abstract
This paper aims to test the hypothesis of the ‘Safe Asset narrative’ which states that banks
became manufacturers of pseudo safe assets to meet a global shortage of safe assets in the precrisis period. In this narrative, securitization is the mechanism which enables banks to become
underwriters of safe assets. This paper takes this hypothesis to the data and attempts to estimate
the causal effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure. In particular, this paper exploits a
regulatory change that occurred in 1987 when the OCC expanded the scope of assets US national
banks could securitize. By using state-chartered banks as a control group and estimating a diff-indiff model, I find that securitization significantly increased banks’ systemic exposure. I then
provide evidence on changes of banks’ balance sheet features to pinpoint a direct channel through
which securitization may have increased banks’ systemic exposure.
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Introduction
Both the subprime mortgage crisis and Eurozone sovereign-debt crisis can be understood
as crises of pseudo-safe assets engineered by the private sector in the US and issued by fiscallyweak countries in Europe. The ‘Safe Asset narrative’ assumes that a global shortage of safe assets
facilitated the excessive issuance of debt instruments during the pre-crisis period. In such a
scheme, the development of securitization may have been a channel through which the safe-asset
shortage materialized in the real economy. Indeed, securitization allowed banks to engineer
pseudo-safe assets by transforming pools of illiquid assets (mortgage, commercial and retail loans)
into liquid (tradable) securities. The resulting assets were labelled as “safe” prior to the crisis even
though they could not insure against systemic risk.
This paper aims to test the hypothesis that banks engaged in securitization as a response to
a safe assets shortage, thus becoming manufacturers of ‘safe assets’ and underwriters of insurance
against systemic risk. In particular, I deliver causal evidence on the effects of securitization on
banks’ systemic exposure. Assessing the impact of securitization on banks’ exposure to systemic
risk presents an empirical challenge as securitization indirectly fueled the growth of a national real
estate mortgage market, thus indirectly exposing banks to systemic shocks. I overcome this
identification challenge by estimating the causal impact of a regulatory change that affected US
banks independently from their connections to the real estate market. By exploiting a regulatory
change to the range of permissible assets that national banks could securitize and using statechartered banks as a control group, I find that securitization significantly increased banks’ systemic
exposure.
Having established a causal link between securitization and banks’ systemic exposure, I
provide further evidence on structural changes to banks’ balance sheets so as to identify the
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channel through which national banks increased their exposure to systemic risk. In doing so, I test
the empirical prediction of the ‘Safe Assets narrative’. In the new ‘Originate and distribute’
banking model that developed after 1990, banks were allowed to originate assets and redistribute
the associated risks through securitization instead of keeping those assets on their balance sheets.
I find that national banks significantly decreased the share of their loans financed by deposits,
which implies that banks increased their reliance on alternative sources of funding to finance their
lending activities. This evidence is consistent with my initial hypothesis and pinpoints a channel
through which securitization may have increased banks’ systemic exposure. Had securitization
been aimed at merely diversifying the banks’ funding structure, we would not observe such
increase in systemic exposure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing economic
literature on the ‘Safe Asset narrative’ and provide theoretical motivation for my empirical
hypothesis. Section 3 presents my identification strategy and Section 4 describes the data. Section
5 and 6 present the results of my diff-in-diff estimation and further evidence of changes to banks’
balance sheet features. Section 7 concludes.

Literature Review & Theoretical Motivation
The ‘Safe Asset Narrative’ of Financial Crises
A recent strand of economic literature on the demand and supply of monetary aggregates
has emerged to explain the cyclical over-issuance of debt instruments leading to debt crises. i In
this framework, monetary aggregates – the so-called ‘safe assets’- encompass money and moneylike financial instruments that are used as cash and transacted without much concern for adverse
selection in financial markets. Unlike the ‘Minskyan approach’ which emphasizes the role of
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agents’ expectations about the value of liquidity, ii the ‘Safe Asset narrative’ focuses on the global
asymmetric issuance of safe assets and assumes that a global shortage of safe assets during the
pre-crisis period facilitated the excessive issuance of debt instruments in advanced economies who
were suppliers of those scare assets. In this framework, the subprime mortgage crisis can be
comprehended as a crisis of pseudo-safe assets engineered by the private sector in the US to meet
the needs of a globally integrated financial system.
In spite of its intuitive explanatory power, this narrative is difficult to test empirically. In
this regard, Gorton, Lewellen and Metrick provide some evidence of a structural change to the
manufacturing of safe assets. While the share of safe assets has remained constant over the last 30
years, the authors point at the change in the components of this share. Governments and banks –
traditional manufacturers of safe assets through sovereign debt issuance and banks’ deposits
certificates – have been replaced by the “shadow banking” sector, which now produces a
substantial fraction of those assets. Indeed, money market mutual funds shares, commercial papers,
repurchase agreements and securitized debt are all money-like instruments that can be used as
collateral in financial markets.

The ‘Safe Asset Narrative’ in Practice: Securitization and Systemic Risk
Focusing on the rise of structured finance is therefore key to test the validity of the ‘Safe
Asset narrative’. Indeed, this narrative implicitly assumes that the development of a new ‘Originate
and distribute’ banking model was a response to the growing demand for safe assets from global
investors. In this model, banks originate loans and resell them to outside investors instead of
keeping those assets on their balance sheets. This process effectively distributes the associated
risks to the rest of the financial sector and release banks from the constraint of keeping illiquid
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assets on their balance sheet. This new model essentially offers alternative funding sources to the
banks who are no longer dependent on their customers’ deposits. If the development of the
‘Originate and distribute’ funding model was a response to the safe asset shortage, the banks’
manufacturing of new financial instruments would be tantamount to the underwriting of insurance
against systemic risk. In this regard, securitization was a channel trough which banks financed the
origination of illiquid loans through the issuance of liquid, thus tradable securities. It is both a risk
transfer and liquidity transformation mechanism whose resulting securitized products were bought
for their perceived safety prior to the crisis. iii
According to the ‘Safe Asset narrative’, the development of securitization should therefore
be concomitant to an increase of banks’ systemic exposure. In their survey of the economic
literature on the effect of growing interconnectedness and increased contagion risk in financial
networks, Paul Glasserman and H. Peyton Young highlight the unsolved question of whether more
interconnectedness tend to amplify or dampen systemic shocks. The ambiguous role played by
securitization is at the heart of this tradeoff. On the one hand, banks can diversify their funding,
thus better insuring themselves against systemic risk. On the other hand, securitization creates new
obligations and increases the dominance of funding liquidity on market liquidity. The bank lending
activity is more subject to adverse shocks as its financing depends on third agents’ perception of
the resulting security liquidity.
Glasserman and Young illustrate the groundwork for models of interconnected balance
sheets with a basic intuitive scheme. Figure 1 show the stylized balance sheet of a bank 𝑖 who has
two categories of assets. ‘Outside assets’ 𝑐𝑖 are claims on non-financial entities such as households
or corporations while ‘In-network assets’ 𝑝𝑖𝑘 are claims on any financial entity 𝑘 such as banks or
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asset managers. Likewise, the bank has ‘Outside liabilities’ 𝑏𝑖 towards depositors and ‘In-network
liabilities’ 𝑝𝑖𝑘 towards financial entities.

I used their stylized representation of banks’ balance sheets to contrast the ‘traditional
banking’ model with the ‘Originate and distribute’ model. The two figures represent the structural
features of a bank’s balance sheet in the two distinctive banking models. In the traditional banking
model, the bank finances the origination of its outside assets with outside liabilities, thus somehow
isolating its traditional lending business from market fluctuations. In the ‘Originate and distribute
model’, the bank combines outside liabilities and in-network liabilities to finance its outside assets.
Implicitly, this structure increases the bank’s financing liquidity and allows the bank to increase
the size of its outside assets. Consequently, this stylized representation of a bank’s balance sheet
sheds light on the new risk of asymmetry caused by securitization. The origination of bank assets
is made increasingly dependent on the liquidity of asset-backed securities and their perceived
safety.
Estimating the effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure is therefore key to
explore the tradeoff between better risk diversification and increased dominance of the safe asset
liquidity on the banks’ origination business. Indeed, securitization may have been a channel
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through which the safe asset global shortage materialized. Before the financial crisis of 2007, the
general consensus was that securitization supported financial stability. iv This view was prevalent
among policy makers such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which
recognized the benefits of securitization:
The need for liquidity and the ability to engage in sound asset-liability
management practices is all the more important to the maintenance of a safe
and sound banking system.v
Securitization was aimed to cater investors’ need for safe assets as the payments tranching allowed
to meet several liquidity needs:
Structural credit enhancement and diversified asset pool free investors of the
need to obtain a detailed understanding of the underlying loans.vi
Consequently, the development of securitization can be viewed as a ‘safe asset’ engine. If
securitization was adopted to create a safe asset, thus turning banks into underwriters of systemic
risk insurance, we should observe an increase in treated banks’ systemic exposure. Testing this
hypothesis could shed light on the role played by bank regulation in enabling this structural change.

Identification: The ‘Security Pacific Letter’
Identification
This paper aims to estimate the causal effect of securitization as a new funding source on
banks’ systemic exposure. Disentangling the effect of securitization as a new funding source from
contemporaneous changes in banks’ systemic exposure represents an empirical challenge. Indeed,
the effect of securitization is twofold. On the asset side, securitization can indirectly increase a
bank’s exposure to systemic risk if the greater amount of assets originated are highly correlated
with systemic events. In the US, securitization fueled the growth of mortgage-backed securities.vii
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Together with other government policies that encouraged home ownership through various tax
subsidies and home finance programs, securitization turned the real-estate market into a national
one and strengthened the transmission line between a shock to the real economy and a bank crisis.
Analyzing the role played by securitization in the increase of banks’ systemic exposure could
therefore lead to overestimation. The aim of my identification strategy is thus to test the direct
effect of securitization as an alternative funding source for banks, independently from its indirect
effects on the underlying assets markets. I overcome this identification challenge by exploiting a
regulatory change regarding securitization which is independent from the story of the real estate
mortgages in the US.

The ‘Security Pacific Letter’
In this section, I argue that the 1987 ‘Security Pacific Letter’ constitutes a valid natural
experiment to test the causal effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure by differentiating
between national commercial banks and state-chartered banks responses.
In the 1980s, the process of securitizing bank assets became much easier. viii In a 1987 letter
to Security Pacific National Bank – the so-called ‘Security Pacific Letter’–, the OCC expanded the
scope of permissible assets national bank could resell as securitized products. In spite of the
applicable Glass Steagall Act, the OCC allowed the underwriting of securitized assets by stating
that national banks could securitize and sell ‘any of their […] lawfully acquired assets’. The
supervisor of federal-chartered banks assumed that the pass-through certificates – representing
claims on the trust holding the underlying illiquid assets - were not ‘securities’ within the meaning
of Glass-Steagall Act and that securitization did not consist in the securities underwriting of the
securities business. The Comptroller’s ruling was challenged by the Securities Industry
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Association which argued that the OCC’s decision allowed national banks to deal in securities,
thus creating a breach to the GSA which clearly separated the banking business from the securities
business. The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the OCC ruling in 1989. The court stated that:
If the activity constitutes the “business of banking,” then the Glass-Steagall Act
prohibitions … do not apply. (885 F. 2d 1034, 1048)
Hence, the court’s decision sanctioned the sale by a national bank of any type of securitized assets,
including the banks’ own consumer credit card receivables, automobile and boat loans,
commercial loans and leases. ix Following this court ruling, the OCC started approving many
securitization programs of national banks after 1989.
I propose to use this regulatory cutoff to isolate the effect that securitization had on national
banks, independently from the underlying securitized assets. This regulatory change represents an
empirical setting where I can differentiate between a treatment and control group, thus satisfying
an essential condition of causal inference in observational studies. In this setting, state-chartered
banks constitute an ideal control group as they were subject to the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) but
not to the OCC ruling. Indeed, the GSA provisions applied to all FDIC insured banks, be they
state-chartered or federally-supervised while OCC rulings only applied to national banks. Given
that both state-chartered banks and national banks were subject to the GSA, I propose to use statechartered banks as a control in this natural experiment. My identification strategy therefore
consists in estimating the change in a bank’s systemic exposure following the regulatory change,
based on whether or not the FDIC insured bank was a state-chartered bank (control) or a national
bank (treatment).
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Data & Methodology
The banks’ betas are used as proxies for their systemic exposure. A bank beta (𝛽𝑖 ) arises
from co-movements of the stock price with the market and therefore captures the systemic
component of a firm’s stock price as opposed to its idiosyncratic component.
I obtained the lists of all FDIC insured banks from 1982 to 1992 from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation website. Estimating my model using FDIC-insured banks only – be they
state-chartered (control) or OCC-chartered (treatment) – was key to ensure that they were subject
to the same regulations prior to 1987. The FDIC dataset indicates whether each affiliated bank was
supervised by the OCC or had a state charter. I matched this dataset with the banks’ betas time
series that I retrieved from the Bloomberg database. To do so, I used the FDIC variable indicating
whether the individual bank was held by a holding company and obtained a list of state-chartered
banks and OCC-chartered banks at the consolidated level. Given that each bank in the control
group needs to be state-chartered and that the outcome variable is observed at the level of the
holding company (‘consolidated’) only, matching the data at the consolidated level avoids
identifying treated banks as state-chartered (control) in situations where the holding company of
different state-chartered banks has an OCC-charter and should therefore be considered as treated.
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Using a market-based measure of systemic risk puts a constraint on my sample. Indeed, many of
the affiliated banks, be they national or state-chartered, were privately held. In order to obtain the
most accurate measure of national and state-chartered banks’ systemic risk, I decided to remove
all holding companies’ whose subsidiaries were not only banks but also insurance companies or
other financial firms (‘diversified financials’). Indeed, the other lines of businesses of such
companies would have created uninformative noise to my response variable. I also checked that
each of my sample bank did not change its regulatory status during my period of interest (19821992).

Lastly, I retrieved data on some of my sample banks’ total assets, total loans, total deposits
and total liabilities from Mergent Online, a database of corporate information covering US and
foreign companies from 1982 onward. A first overview of the differences in banks’ systemic
exposure before and after the 1987 regulatory cutoff date is provided below. The changes in the
distribution of the OCC-chartered banks’ betas should serve as a preliminary guess regarding the
sign and magnitude of the causal effect of securitization.
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To assess the internal validity of my empirical strategy, I first used my sample to test the
parallel trend assumption, which is critical to any diff-in-diff identification strategy. Ensuring that
both the control and treatment group have parallel trends in their outcomes values prior to the
treatment should support the appropriateness of the chosen control group as a counterfactual. I
therefore plotted the moving average of each bank’s stock beta time series, covering the period
from 1982 to 1992. Figure 3 shows the moving average trend of each bank group – national and
state-chartered banks.
Consistent with my identification assumption, Figure 3 shows that state-chartered and
national banks’ betas followed the same trend prior to 1987 when the OCC released the ‘Security
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Pacific Letter’. I formally tested the robustness of this identification assumption in section 5.C.

The Effect of Securitization on Banks’ Systemic Exposure
Model Specification

I used the banks panel data to estimate the following diff-in-diff model:
βit = αi + st + θ Dit + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1)
In this model, each bank 𝑖’s beta at time 𝑡 – thereafter denoted βit – is regressed on its entity fixed
effects αi , time fixed effects st and a treatment dummy Dit .
= 1,
Dit = {
= 0,

𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 1987
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Note that the coefficient of interest in this regression model is θ, whose sign and magnitude
indicates whether the regulatory shock increased or decreased national banks’ systemic exposure.
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Results
Dependent variable:
OLS
OLS
with Standard clustered errors
(1)

(2)

0.067***

0.067***

(0.014)

(0.015)

0.683*

0.683*

(0.407)

(0.407)

Time fixed effects

YES

YES

Entity fixed effects

YES

YES

Observations

27,639

27,639

R2

0.491

0.490

Adjusted R2

0.480

0.479

Treatment θ

Constant

0.404
Residual Std. Error
(df = 27067)
F Statistic (df = 571;
45.672***

45.672***

27067)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table 1: The ‘Security Pacific Letter’ effect on national banks’ systemic exposure
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Table 1 reports the main results from the estimated model. Column 1 shows the point
estimates derived using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Column 2 shows the point estimates of the
same model estimated with standard errors clustered at the bank level.
The two estimated coefficients have high statistical significance (one percent) and are
robust to clustered standard errors. The point estimates on the treatment dummy variable are pretty
consistent across all estimated models and robust to outlying values. The above estimated model
thus suggests that the OCC decision increased national banks’ systemic exposure by 0.07. The
tables consequently support the view that exposure to securitization increased banks’ systemic
exposure.

Robustness of Parallel Trend Assumption
In order to assess the robustness of my identification assumption, I estimated the following
model:
βit = αi + st + ∑𝑖 𝜌𝑡 (Gi × 𝑠𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2)
In this model, I regress banks’ betas on time and entity fixed effects and an interaction term
between time fixed effects st and a dummy variable Gi indicating whether the bank 𝑖 belonged to
the treatment group (national bank) or control group (state-chartered bank).
Gi = {

= 1,
= 0,

𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘

This model aims at testing the parallel trend assumption, which is a necessary condition to
estimate causality in a difference-in-differences empirical setting. In particular, estimating the
difference in the mean response of the treatment and control group implies that the assignment of
treatment should be insignificant before the treatment date. The coefficients of interest in this
specification are therefore the series of coefficients on the interaction term between group

Page 17 of 22
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018

17

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 4

assignment and time fixed effects 𝜌𝑡 . In the hypothesis that state-chartered banks constitute a valid
control group, the series of 𝜌𝑡 should equal 0 before the regulatory cutoff date and be significantly
different from 0 after the treatment.
The time series of 𝜌𝑡 and their 99% confidence intervals are plotted in figure 4.

Figure 5 : Time series of the Group assignment statistical significance

Figure 4 supports the parallel trend assumption of this empirical setting. The point
estimates are statistically insignificant before 1987 and present statistical significance after 1990.

Discussion: Identification of a potential direct channel
My results consequently point at an indirect effect of securitization on banks’ systemic
exposure. However, this empirical setting does not allow me to pinpoint the direct channel through
which the regulation impacted banks’ balance sheet and therefore their systemic exposure. To
identify the potential channel explaining the estimated indirect effect, I used the panel data on
banks’ balance sheets retrieved from Mergent online. Based on random sample of 50 banks, I

Page 18 of 22
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss2/4

18

dell'Isola: The causal effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure

found data on only 25 banks’ balance sheets. I then computed the Loan to Deposits ratio of each
bank in 1986 and 1992. I propose this ratio as a proxy for the share of a bank’s lending activity
that is financed through deposits. In a traditional banking model, this ratio should therefore be
close to 1 as the bank only uses outside liabilities (deposits) to fund the origination of outside
assets (loans). Table 3 shows the growth rate of the Loan to Deposits Ratios for both national and
state-chartered banks between 1986 and 1992.

I decided not to run any formal diff-in-diff model because of the small sample size. Instead,
this data is only aimed at giving a hint of the direct mechanism at stake and should serve as a basis
for future research using this empirical setting. Both national and state-chartered banks decreased
their loan to deposits ratios. Hence, the share of outside assets financed by outside liabilities
decreased for both groups of banks, thus explaining a common upward trend of in their systemic
exposure. Furthermore, the difference in percentage growth shed light on the effect of
securitization on banks’ systemic exposure. The decline in the share of outside assets funded by
outside liabilities between 1986 and 1992 is significantly higher for national banks. This result
suggests that national banks were able to increase the size of their loan portfolio through Innetwork liabilities, thus increasing their exposure to systemic risk.
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These results are consistent with the ‘Safe Asset narrative’. In particular, the causal
increase in banks’ systemic risk as a result of securitization validates a key prediction of the safe
asset framework. Indeed, had the banks engaged in securitization for other reasons than meeting a
shortage of safe assets through the engineering of liquid securities, we would not necessarily have
observed an increase in their systemic risk. Securitization would have merely resulted in a change
in the funding structure of the banks and the better diversification of their funding sources may
have resulted even in lower systemic risk. Instead, my results pinpoint at a mechanism that is
accounted for in the ‘safe asset narrative’. Securitization did not only result in a change in the
funding structure of banks but also incentivized them to originate new outside assets so as to sell
pseudo safe securities to in-network investors. Hence, the increase in banks’ systemic risk puts in
evidence a change in banks’ incentives and their engagement in a new business aimed at catering
a growing demand for safe assets. Instead of attempting to measure changes in global investors’
demand for safe assets in order to validate the ‘safe asset narrative’, my approach thus looks for
evidence on the sell-side of new incentives created by a safe asset shortage.

Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence on the causal effect of bank deregulation on banks’
systemic exposure. By using state-chartered banks as a control group and exploiting a regulatory
change to the permissibility of securitization, I find that securitization significantly increased
banks’ systemic exposure.
These findings provide further empirical evidence for the validity of the ‘Safe Asset
narrative’. Consistently with the intuition of this narrative, banks seemed to have increased the
underwriting of safe assets through securitization, thus mechanically increasing their exposure to
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systemic risk. While the estimated causal effect shows that securitization has an indirect effect on
banks’ systemic exposure, I use banks’ balance sheet data to pinpoint the structural changes at the
bank level that drove this result. I find that banks that were able to securitize their assets
significantly increased the share of in-network liabilities used to finance the origination of assets.
Thus, securitization seems to act as an alternative funding source for banks, thereby increasing
their systemic exposure by reinforcing the dominance of funding liquidity on their lending
business.
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